Inspired as much by interfaith dialogue as by ethnographic discussions of intersubjectivity, I draw some narrow debates within Indian Islam outside of their usual South Asianist and/or Islam-centric frameworks and also resist the academic injunction to purify boundaries between theology and anthropological analysis. I present ethnography from Kerala factional debates raising two vexed questions: authority of interpretation; and the matter of shirk or deviation from tauheed, or true monotheism. My analysis follows impulses towards, firstly, a de-exceptionalising of Islam via comparison, drawing ethnography towards a wider 'Abrahamic' framework, in an eccentric move of reading Islamic debates through moments in commentary on Christian traditions; and secondly, I engage recent theological moves toward performative and deconstructive readings of religion. In Muslim traditions, Quran and hadith as ultimate authority are supported by the methods of qiyas -analogy -and considerations of ijmacommunity consensus. From the beginning, Islam has recognised that, "The Quran does not speak with a tongue; it needs interpreters and interpreters are people" (Esack, 1997) . Performative and deconstructive understandings of religion are perhaps then already anticipated in the Islamic tradition, unlike (Western) Christianity, which has long been restrained by a narrow focus upon either scriptura or traditio -with the third pole of 'community consensus' hidden from sight and not often acknowledged, matters of consensus/performativity only recently becoming recognised as a proper and legitimate part of processes of interpretation, as Dalit, queer and feminist theologies emerge and come of age.
Introduction
In the 20 years between Katherine Ewing's careful disavowal of the ethnographer's "temptation to believe" (1994) and Meneses, et al.' s daring proposal for an anthropological "epistemology of witness," grounded in evangelical Christian readings of good and evil (2014) , lie (on the one hand) Simon Coleman's sensitive discussion of the dangers of exposing oneself as an insufficiently distanced "abomination" (2008) and (on the other) a bold exposure effected by Saba Mahmood and others of the partiality of the secular world-view and its claims to neutrality (Mahmood, 2006 (Mahmood, , 2008 (Mahmood, , 2009 Zine, 2004) . Inspired by this trajectory and as much by interfaith dialogue as by ethnographic discussions of intersubjectivity, it is in a spirit of feeling that the time is (finally) right that I set aside criticisms of projects of comparative religion, draw some very narrow debates within Indian Islam outside of their customary analytic framework and into a wider one, and offer some thoughts on two vexed questions dear to the heart of Muslims: authority of interpretation; and the matter of shirk or devia- pathways: reformists deplore tombs, saints, shrine festivals, intercessionary prayer, zikr (remembrance chants), moulud (celebrating the prophet's birthday) and so on;
traditionalists engage in such practices and defend them. There is no need in this paper to reproduce what is an utterly banal ethnographic scenario, and I will use my space instead for analysis and argument, where I will follow firstly, my impulse towards a de-exceptionalising of Islam, making an eccentric move to read debates in Islam through Christian theologies 3 and secondly, make a suggestion that theological insights may be useful for academics, before finally turning to recent moves towards performative theologies and what they might do.
Writing Against Purification
Recently, working with sympathies to interfaith dialogues, some Christian theologians have called for Christians actively to engage with Islam in order to understand better the nature of the Abrahamic God which the two traditions share (e.g. Swanson, 2005a Swanson, , 2005b . Swanson (2005b) , who teaches Protestant Christian theology to those who will enter (Lutheran) ministry, has argued, for example, that, "Christians need to recognise more fully the force of Muslim arguments on behalf of the oneness of God against the doctrine of the Trinity . . . . Christians could benefit from the concept of shirk". Nicholas Lash, holding for 20 years the chair of theology at Cambridge and Britain's seniormost Catholic theologian, offers at once a most elegant formulation and a very useful generalising statement which can apply across the board of all three Abrahamic faiths, when he claims that, "People fail in religion in one of two ways: they either treat some creature or creatures as God, or they treat God as a creature" (Lash, 2007: 30-35) . Such 'thinking across' theological debates and literatures can then be helpful; and taking theology not as inferior object of study for academic discourse but as coeval partner in a conversation can also be helpful.
I am interested in possibilities for conversations both ethnographic and interfaith in the worlds of Islam and Christianity. As such, I want to situate my Kerala ethnographic material into wider anthropology of religion debates and write against the grain of two types of exceptionalism and narrow focus: firstly, a South Asianist narrow bias, something which is all too common via regional studies; and secondly, another common analytic which would exceptionalise Islam (Coleman, 2013 I also refuse all representations which would treat Islam as a middle-eastern religion.
Instead, on the one hand I treat both Christianity and Islam as analagous in being global networked religions (Voll, 1994) and discursive traditions (Asad, 1986) , while on the other hand also holding fast that we need to pay good attention to ethnographic situatedness and complexity, without ever falling into the 'many Islams' or 'many Christianities' trap (Osella & Osella, 2007) . We must recognise the global/ised nature of both Islam and Christianity, and to keep our ear attuned to the claims of these two Abrahamic traditions for global status and for universalistic messages and concerns. I am dispensing with the anthropologist's usual rich empirical and ethnographic detail, and will only use short examples where needed to make a point. My ethnography of the differences and arguments between sects is predictable and does not differ from similar material about the reform process which we find over and over throughout the Muslim world (e.g. Ewing, 1997; Blank, 2001) .
Recently, we've witnessed academic interrogations of the putative neutrality of secularism and secularity (e.g. Mahmood 2006 Mahmood , 2011 . This challenge has not been adequately responded to, which is not surprising. Still, some scholars have raised the question of the slippage between a commitment to secularism into a supporting of atheism, a kind of rationalist imperative within hegemonic traditions of doing academic work (King, 2002) . There are emerging explorations into the normativity and disciplining mechanism of atheism within the academy (e.g. Zine, 2004) . Others are experimenting with possibilities for bringing faith-based academic work into academic conversations, albeit dressed in the rationally respectable clothing of 'philosophy' (Kresse, 2007) . If, as Simon Coleman has noted, academics are not likely to take up the call to permit coevalness to the marginalised faith-based stance 5 , but to remain extremely hostile to such moves (2008), then the academy must at least now begin to explore more carefully its own positioning. It ought to cease to privilege the highly particularistic ideological commitment to atheism or secularism (with the latter being such a problematic term, however defined) as some sort of imagined neutral ground, and begin to take up the challenge set by the work of Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood to examine 'secularism' as culturally and historically specific. We can recognise that atheism and secularism alike are -like faith -matters of commitment: a positioning of the academic which will shape, produce, and foreclose that academic's analytic possibilities, a standpoint (Naples & Gurr, 2013) which will produce certain kinds of analysis.
This point leads me back to the question of the status of theological writings for those of us working in the academic field of religion. These often offer us highly nuanced and sophisticated discussions, such that it is unhelpful to treat such work entirely as 'insider discourse', or as artefacts whose insights are to be analysed, but never taken on board. As an experiment, in this paper I take a lead from performative/post-modern theologies (they're not the same) to think through the issues raised by my Islamic material. My hope is that this move might at once, firstly, demonstrate the potential of academic moves towards a de-exceptionalising comparison; secondly, suggest interesting directions for future comparative analysis; thirdly, bring academic theology into the conversation and prompt us to begin to engage 5 I'm keeping the term 'faith based' because it is in common use, but would register that this term is equally problematic, emerging from an understanding that a relationship to God is a matter of faith or belief, which is a stance which my research respondents would deny, grounding their relation to
Islam instead in practice, knowledge, experience, ancient and revealed wisdom, and so on.
with it; and finally, contribute to the unsettling of the liberal secular hegemony which has held sway in academic life. We are in a moment in which a pluralist framework now seems possible. Eve Sedgwick deftly showed us how academic practice came to be ruled by paranoid thinking and by stances of cynicism, disbelief, mistrust, fear, disavowal (1997 Finally, then, I want to move at the end of this paper towards observing and playing around a little with some possible lines of thought emerging from the post-1980s seeping into analytic and theological discourses alike of frameworks which stress the inauthenticity of all human attempts to describe and classify, and to capture 'reality'.
As John Caputo (1997) to a full transcript in English, and here I only mention a few points which I draw from that transcript.
As I had expected, Mujahids accuse Sunni traditionalists of engaging in shirk when they 'give too much respect' to saints; also stereotypically, Mujahids argue that petitioning saints or holy people for help is equivalent to praying and hence is also shirk. Traditionalists also give the usual responses when defending their practices, for example, insisting that at a shrine they are 'praying with' and not 'praying to' a saint. So far, so predictable, so familiar (e.g. Van der Veer, 1992; Mayaram, 1997; Alam, 2008; Zaman, 2010) . But what I had not expected to find was that traditionalists are equally keen to lay accusations of shirk at the door of reformists. How can this happen?
Traditionalist and Mujahid scholars engage in highly complex arguments about agency, power and whether power is divisible or not, and -against my expectations, formed from familiarity with academic literatures about the different styles of
Islam -both accuse the other side of dilution of God's singular power.
At one point in the public Kuttichira debate, the reformist Mujahids discuss isthigasa (help-seeking), and argue that Sunnis who pray and ask help at a saint's shrine are effectively praying not to God but petitioning and praying to the saint, hence committing shirk. This is coherent and familiar ground. But -unexpectedlyMujahids appear in the debate as being also at pains to refute Sunni accusations that they, the reformists, are the ones committing blasphemy, by splitting God's power and giving some of it to human beings. Let me explain how this accusation arises.
At one point, the Mujahid speaker Abdulkhadar has the floor. He insists that power and agency in the world can be split: he points out that if one wants the salt at table, one knows well that it is in the capacity of a fellow diner to pass it, and so, "We don't ask for salt to God, believing that God would come down here with the salt."
This reformist speaker insists upon making a distinction between human agencypassing the salt is covered under this -and divine agency -which is, he claims, a quite different type of agency, and is the type which is -blasphemously -being attributed by Sunnis to human and saintly intercessors.
Speaking for the Sunni traditionalists, AP Aboobacker Musaliyar first returns to earlier discussion of isthigasa. He reiterates the Sunni traditionalist position that "asking for help" is not "worship," that the two must be understood as distinct, and that petitioning saints is legitimate. He also argues that Islamic injunctions referring specifically to prohibitions on idol-worship are being wrongly extended by Mujahids towards legitimate 'helping' relationships with saints, martyrs, angels, and so on. AP also reiterates that all agency flows from God, even in the most trivial and mundane issues (like passing the salt at dinner), and that it is indeed possible to ask God for anything.
This traditionalist speaker then turns on the Mujahids, "You yourselves have said that medicine is not capable alone to cure -that is what we are saying too."
He also points out that God in the Quran itself promises the help of a thousand angels. He insists, "Gabriel helps. Believers and pious people help." He wonders why the Mujahids continue to ignore this and insist that we can only ask God for help.
EK Hassan for the traditionalists then also reiterates that all agency flows from
God and repeats the accusation that to differentiate those actions which are within human agency/capability from those actions which go beyond it and into the realm of God, is itself a form of blasphemy. He asks the Mujahid reformists how they can possibly divide power into two types, when the Prophet taught that everything comes from God. Hassan also then reinforces the legitimacy of petition, by moving on to cite verses wherein it is advised that Gabriel, angels and rightful people will be helpers. Hassan ends dramatically:
We can ask for rain, children and what not. When science progresses, the reason behind everything will be discovered and there won't be any need for God.
This is the place where these Moulavis [reformist teachers] are leading us.
AP Abdulkhadar Moulavi (for the Mujahid reformists) responds that ordinary help
seeking -isthigasa -is an ordinary and natural help, which is legitimate; but that asking God's help is a different type of asking, where a different type of help is expected.
It is, he claims, clearly this type of -supernatural -help which Sunnis expect when they conventionally call upon the martyrs of the battle of Badr. AP then proceeds to condemn the common practice of making appeals to martyrs and saints: "Nobody asks help to Muhyudeen Sheikh with a belief that he can help in a natural manner."
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In this and similar exchanges, two things are happening: firstly, the traditionalists are calling upon textual authority to back up their claims that petitioning help is permissible and that there are lesser agents who do legitimately help humans; and secondly, traditionalists turn the tables by insisting that it is the reformists who must face the accusation of siphoning power away from its proper source -God -and of committing the dreadful mistake of attributing God's power, not even to the saints 6 Muhyudeen is the most popular martyr-saint in Kerala, and the practice of reciting in his name and chanting the moideen mala, poetic verses recounting his story, as a form of prayer and petition, was formerly widespread and still endures today in Sunni pockets. The vocative exclamation "Oh! My martyrs of the Battle of Badra!" (Ente daivame! Ente Badringale!) was a common one in pre-reform times, in the same way that vocative "Oh! My God!" is common among Kerala Hindus and Christians.
or to the friends of God who may indeed be accepted as having powers of intercession, but to any ordinary human who is able to "pass the salt" at table.
The issue of sect differences and these endless points and counter points in lengthy and repeated public debates like the classic one at Kuttichira seem to turn almost exclusively on one key issue: whether one is or is not a proper monotheist.
The anxiety and issue on both sides then becomes to prove that what one does is not shirk. This is an interesting departure from the trend in academic discussions of such debates, which focus upon reformist critique of saint and shrine practices, but do not enter into the complexities of debates; nor consider counter charges.
Ethnographers have tended to work with one group and not to focus on interactions across sectarian divisions; and nowhere have I read about reformists being the ones at risk of shirk.
In my next analytical move, I note that in ulema debates, the relative weight While Sunnis have been forced (since the 1930s) into public debates in which textual authority is given precedence, they have also manage to push past the argument that everything that is Islam can be straightforwardly or simply traced back to or read from texts. In debate, they counter:
There is no point in boasting that you have recited ten verses. We can't show the verse which prohibits us to marry our sister and to marry another girl . . .
Sunni ulema also defend extra-textual referents, and plead for the need for Islam to allow a place for tradition. At times, they also (carefully and discreetly) argue in terms of a 'greater good' and for the imperative this puts on ulema to work pragmatically with the needs and existing practice of believers. This point will also become important later when I discuss below more fully the triangle of 'text,' 'tradition,' and ' community.'
In the public Kuttichira debate which I have drawn from above, the Sunnis close in a dramatic way. After a succession of (male) speakers offer point and counter-point, each leader is asked to offer his final words, in the manner of a modernist legal court case summing-up. Mujahids were granted first and penultimate words, Sunnis the last.
In a sudden departure from the tone of the entire 5-day debate -rational argu- (1996) . The importance evangelicals give to Bible, as foundational and opposed to tradition, leaves them committed, for sure, to textualism but also to a sense of the power of the Word. Coleman discusses ways in which evangelicals understand God's Word as an active, agentive force on its own, beyond human agency, and ways in which they expect to see it intruding into presentations and discussions, working in miraculous ways beyond rational discussion to change the heart of the listener (cf. Keane, 2008) .
Holding tightly to textualism is not then, I am arguing, necessarily what is at the root of Mujahid rationalism; it is more likely Kerala's modernist formal-legalist (and often Marxist) public culture which inflects the Mujahid religious aesthetic.
Let us think now a little more about the ways in which social groups ally themselves with 'text' and/or 'tradition' and the ways in which tension arises over which of the pair should be used as a guide for ultimate arbitration, via a detour into Christian histories. This will lead us to an unexpected place. that I am certain the pope is the Antichrist", or "Reason is a whore, the greatest enemy that faith has" (also variously attributed to Martin Luther).
Christian clergy and lay people alike still commonly understand and frame the distinctions between Catholic and Protestant as covering issues such as the possibility or impossibility of intercession, the extent of the power granted to religious specialists and officials, the place of ritual in one's religious life and how it is to be understood in relation to internal intentionality, the status and importance to be given to founding texts, and so on -all very familiar ground to Christians and Muslims alike, then. For now, I want simply to note that all of these discussions down the years since the Reformation -lay, academic, theological -have generally been (Csordas, 2007) . Like Kerala's Sunni Muslims who nowadays engage in public debate justifying their theological positions with reference to texts, the contemporary Catholic church has also made a turn towards a "theology of the Word" (see e.g. Cherbonnier, 1953) , previously the preserve of Protestants.
Let me take the next step in my argument, which leads me towards the work of Najeeb George Awad, a theologian of the eastern Christian church. 7 Awad has 7 National Reformed Synod of Syria and Lebanon. Choosing an Orthodox Eastern Christian theologian is also part of my rhetorical work of refusing to forget Christianity's 'forgotten lung' (Pope John Paul, n. date) or to pit 'western' Christianity against 'Eastern' Islam. India hosts both global religous traditions from their outset (Visvanathan, 1999; Mosse, 2012; Ho, 2006; Ricci, 2011). argued that this classic Christian division between scripture and tradition is rooted in misunderstandings of the relationship between scriptura and traditio, and even of the position of Martin Luther. Luther, while he certainly rejected papal authority as arbiter of theological authenticity, did not by any means reject traditio (Awad, 2008) .
Awad also makes the very important point that Luther rejected outright the possibility of hermeneutics based on individual understandings of scriptura and insisted upon the role of the Church in passing on scripture to believers, thereby, we have to note, allowing a strong role to the church and to its traditions (2008: 68). Awad also points out that the very existence of differences between different Protestant sects'
interpretations of scripture is due to the contact made by texts with different communities of readers, and by this move, Awad allows in a third pole -community -to the classic binary (2008: 74). Awad's point about there being an unacknowledged third aspect which we need to keep in mind -giving us now a three-cornered interpretive ground of scripture, tradition, and a community -is important.
Returning to Kerala ulema debates (exactly as one would predict and expect)
Mujahids claim a stance as 'scripturalists' -"We put verses before you . . . we demand more verses from you" -and Sunni traditionalists respond to this with an anti-scripturalist stance which asserts that not all that is right is contained in verses -"There is no point in boasting that you have recited ten verses. We can't show the verse which prohibits us to marry our sister." But the detour into a parallel Abrahamic texttradition binary and Awad's assessment of it pushes recognition that both sides are actually drawing upon complex configurations, which themselves pull in a combination of appeals: to scripture, to tradition, to contemporary practice, to pragmatic and aesthetic-affectual considerations and to the mysteriousness or the clarity of God's instructions and communications. Assemblages of various human and non-human factors come together temporarily into moments of debate or encounter or decision, to produce positions which then become ossified into objects with power and afterlife, named 'Mujahid' or 'Sunni', and shorthanded as associated with 'text' or 'tradition' (Stausberg, 2010) . As Awad argues for the Christian case, the gulf between Muslim sects is more apparent than real. Both sides actually draw upon dynamic recommendations for practice rooted for authority within a powerful text which, both sides recognise, must never be interpreted individually, but always within the context of a recognised tradition, with tradition necessarily embedded -whether ulema disavow this or not -in a contemporary living community who claim to be heirs to it. Just as Christians may imagine themselves as engaged in a struggle to return to the Desert Fathers or perhaps to the early church in their revival movements, but will never actually be able to know -much less replicate -those forms of practice, faith, subjectivity, institutions or community, and will instead produce a contemporary version of a contemporary understanding of early Christianity, so too
Islam is necessarily dealing with text and tradition as they appear now to the people who live them today.
The move towards a foundational appeal to a divide between 'text' and 'tradition,' and the production of communities who then imagine themselves as following ' only the text' or opposing this with arguments that 'text alone is not enough' is then not in any way a description of reality but is part of the rhetorical work of difference making and community building. This points towards recent understandings of sect difference as actively and continually produced and performed, as being about the identity work necessary if one is to call oneself 'Sunni' or 'Mujahid', rather than as being rooted in foundational difference or being anchored in actually existing incommensurate differences of doctrine, practice or interpretative method. As Arshad Alam argues, discussions about Islam may at heart be less about Muslim vs.
non-Muslim dynamics than about the production of sectarian difference and reproduction of community, a matter of doing the continual identity work which is necessary if one is to be able to pronounce oneself as 'Sunni' or 'Mujahid' (Alam, 2008) .
When ulema or laity argue and debate, something is clearly being performed:
while sectarian stakes were high in the 1930s and 1940s, with families torn apart by dis agreement, stone throwing along the road, defections, ostracism and so on, nowadays positions have settled and it is not likely that many -any? -people will leave a public debate convinced by what they have heard that they must change their position and practice. In the post-1970s days, at the end of the Kuttchira debate, the two sides part, each having stated and re-stated their already well-known positions and brought out into the public square some well-worn arguments. In the extracts above, nobody involved is expecting sudden revelatory change on either side simply as a result of listening to the speeches; the debate is more a matter of enacting difference, of bringing supporters of the two sides together and allowing them to make public display of their difference and of their disdain for each other.
Once again swerving sideways, we can think about how the four great christological councils were enacted (325 Nicea, 381 Constantinople, 431 Ephesus, 451 Chalcedon). These early church councils were public debates which eventually produced orthodoxy and identified heresy with regard to the question of how
Christ could be at once 'fully human' and 'fully divine,' and the histories of these debates suggest to us the degree to which they were embedded in communities of practice, who then undertook dramatised public performances and shows of allegiance (Hanson, 2005; Ayres, 2006) . Public debates on matters raised by the councils spread, as individual bishops vied to push forward their specific stance, and it seems that these local events were also at least as much about rhetorical flourish Imbichibi, an elderly lady who had remained untouched and unimpressed by the reformist waves which had swept through her own household, responded to her niece's teasing and criticisms with the remark: "How can you say that going to see the Thangal is a bad thing? Is he a bad man? No, you know he is not. He is a good man, so how could this be wrong?"
As with Catholic and Protestant, who tend to imagine themselves as incommensurable communities rooted in a fondness for either traditio or for scriptura, but who actually tread remarkably similar ground and who have to do strong performative work in order to maintain the differences between them, so too, Mujahid and
Sunni traditionalists, when we engage them in close interaction, do not appear to be standing on either side of an insurmountable mountain, as their rhetorics -ulema and laity alike -would have us believe. They are, indeed, able to engage in public debate exactly because the appeals to reasoning and the terms of authentication are common to both: that sect leaders and scholars can give guidance to laity through appeals to practices which are rooted in a solid community of believers, and which can also often (but not always) be justified by reference to text.
And taking more time to reflect upon the details of the ulema debate above draws us into recognising that, while Mujahids claim a stance as 'scripturalists' -"We put verses before you . . . we demand more verses from you" -and while Sunni traditionalists respond to this with a stance which asserts that not all that is right is contained in verses -"There is no point in boasting that you have recited ten verses.
We can't show the verse which prohibits us to marry our sister" -actually both sides are drawing in the debate upon complex configurations which pull in a combination of appeals: to scripture, to tradition, to contemporary practice, to pragmatic considerations and to the mysteriousness or the clarity of God's instructions and communications.
We must not then take at face value ulema -or anybody else's -claims to be working straightforwardly from a text or a tradition, although such claims are, of course, generally made in good faith. We must complexify our understandings of what is happening when people make critique and debate. In an equally important move, we must also go beyond a modernist perspective which imagines that 'reasoned debate' with textual evidence is actually how theological shifts do proceedor must proceed. Recent academic trends have emphasised the democratisation of theological debate, as first print and then audio cassettes, DVDs, reading and study groups, and the like spread (Robinson, 1993; Hirschkind, 2006) . I wonder if perhaps the effects of these changes is sometimes overestimated and whether at times 
Performative Communities
Let me now make another comparative turn, by bringing in discussion of recent developments in Christian theology; this will demonstrate that -as I am by now arguing -understanding all reasoning and action as framed in a performative mode does not -as one might imagine -weaken the ulema arguments, as they clearly fear by sticking publicly to 'theology' and purging ' context' out, nor does it in any way discredit ulema private discussions of the imperative to consider wider issues as mere 'instrumentalism' on their part.
Butler's work on the ways in which sex/gender works has been taken up amongst those interested in how religion works. Ken Stone offers a short and lucid exposition of Butler's theory and how it is now being extended in contemporary theologies.
Butler's work explores the possibility that gender, rather than being conceived in a modernist fashion as the social interpretation of stable sexed bodies, is best understood in terms of collective practices that produce perceptions of fixed sexes and genders as performative effects. So too the Bible, often conceived as a fixed object, may be reconceptualised in terms of the collective practices, including conventional modes of scholarly and popular analysis, that produce perceptions of a single, stable Bible as performative effects.
Martin argues forcefully that textual meaning is inseparable from hermeneutics and interpretive rhetoric, which take place in specific contexts and under the influence of traditions and interpretive communities (religious and scholarly) . . . Martin's argument [is] that notions about textual agency actually conceal readerly moves. (Stone, 2008: 1) Within Christianity, out of this performative turn has emerged a new Christian theology. There are some theologians who are not threatened by Butlerian analysis, but are embracing it and trying to use its insights. Armour, et al. (2006) , Bielo (2008 ), Shults (2014 , Stone and many others note the contemporary re-imagining of biblical theologies. "For biblical theologies, too, can be reimagined as performative enterprises" (Stone, 2008: 11) . The implications of this performative embrace of Butlerian insights are that 'Scripture' here, refers not to some reality lying behind the text (whether in a reconstructed history or a reconstructed authorial intention), but rather to meanings reached or created "in the performance of Scripture . . . in the enacting of Scripture in particular practices" (Dale Martin, 2006 , cited in Stone, 2008 To understand how the critical, post-Butlerian framework is being understood by some Christian theologians not as threatening but as eventually allowing for a reinvigorated relationship to religion, let us turn again to Stone, who lays out the extension of Butler into religion as follows:
I would like to consider the possibility that 'Bible' stands to 'hermeneutics,'
here, in something like the same way that 'sex' stands to 'gender' in conven- noun. Bible, too, has more to do with doing than with being. (Stone, 2008: 6) Those who are picking up performativity -be that in mainstream or in feminist, queer and other dissident theological circles -point out that, "Textual meaning is inseparable from hermenutics and interpretive rhetoric, which take place in specific contexts and under the influence of traditions and interpretive communities religious and scholarly" (Stone, 2008: 2 (Soroush, 2000; Arkoun, 2003) . There is a gathering wave of female scholars working through processes of ijtihad to challenge hegemonic and customary practice which claim Islamic theological grounding (Barlas, 2002; Wudud, 1999; Vatuk, 2013 also structure and produce religious subjectivities in people, then firstly, there can never be a possibility of reaching a pure, authentic interpretation, and, secondly, all people whose religious subjectivities are produced through engagement and inter action with 'Quran' and 'Islam' are part of the process of producing 'Quran' and 'Islam.' New performative critics go much further, in seeking to lay bare the politics by which texts have been interpreted in certain directions and in refusing any notion at all of any possible authenticity, guarantee by way of a revelation of authorial intention or, sometimes, limits to potential future interpretive moves.
If the prospect of emerging feminist Islamic theologies and queer Islamic theologies are too much -right now -for many to bear, just as liberation theologies, Dalit theologies and queer Christian theologies undoubtedly exist, but are, for some in the church, impossible to understand or accept (Mosse, 2012) , then perhaps Awad -himself a preacher and theologian of the National Reformed Synod of Syria and Lebanon -will give some comfort to them. Awad strongly suggests that interpretation is not and can never be a free for all, but must continue to move carefully between the limits and constraints set by existing frameworks. Yip (2005) delineates four strategies of re-reading Islamic and Christian texts among queer subjects, of which only one -the last -is a subjective 'my meaning' positioning. Lash himself -a sympathetic reader of performative theologies who is nonetheless firmly located within the Roman Catholic church -states unequivocally: "The emphasis on responsibility is emphatically not an encouragement to individualism -to myths of 'my' meaning" (Lash, 2007: 3) . We are not then on the territory described by Robert Bellah in his 'Habits of the Heart', with Sheila-ism, or the faith which is held on to by an ' about turn' towards the pure grounds of ' community', such that any community can claim the right to interpret texts or adopt practices, in their own way, as heir and performers of, and rightful innovators within, a particular 'tradition'. He asks us to work with a triangle, coming close (I note) to a Peircian semiotics, in which we have the referent; the signified; the signifier; and the interpretant, and in which 'interpretant', the particular person who is hearing or reading a signifier, is given weight.
The material-social circumstances of any utterance become not a sidelined ' context' but an intrinsic part of the meaning making (Peirce, 1991) .
Conclusion
Butlerian readings of religion understand that structures (texts, traditions, communities) exist which demand coherence and 'readability' in the subjects which they produce. The particular subjectivities which emerge must always signify to others and not merely to an individual; there is an imperative towards readability to others of any particular 'Quran'. As Butler points out, the demands of iterability and citability do also tend to buttress existing tendencies, referring as they do to already completed successful performances, past citations and previous copies; at the same time, the continued production of the abjected ' outside' and the inevitable imbrication of power in practices of citation make it highly likely that feminist, queer and other theological strands being produced by minorities will not easily move into the centre as acceptable ' copies' of that ' original' which can never be grasped/does not actually exist. What is relegated to the outside, as abject, rejected (for Butler, the 'bodies that do not matter', such as the bodies of trans people), then produces the ones that do matter, the normative, the hegemonic, the ones allowed pride of place at the centre.
As Stone suggests: "The Bibles produced in the . . . theologies of Eichrodt, Von Rad, and Brueggemann are clearly different from one another, and different yet again from that found in the work of . . . Childs. Each of these produces an 'intelligible'
Bible that matters, which also relies on its particular constitutive outside" (Stone, 2008: 11) . Dissident communities like anarca-Muslims (Veneuse, 2014) or the queer subjects discussed by Yip all produce (at the moment) 'Qurans' which, from the point of view of the mainstream, decidedly do not 'matter' (Yip, 2005 (Yip, , 2007 .
Of course, one might expect many theologians to resist the performative turn
and understanding of what they are engaged in doing. Embracing a performative theological understanding opens up even more radical possibilities for interpretation and practice than does the by-now very well-rehearsed argument that greater exposure and Islamic knowledge democratises processes of ijtihad (e.g. Huq, 2008; Mirza, 2008; Vatuk, 2013) . Crucially, the performative turn disempowers religious specialists by placing them within the same space in relation to critique as nonspecialists, and insists that all critique and commentary is inevitably immanent.
While some might be tempted to dismiss such commentators as Amina Wadud -the African American Muslim revert who has controversially led mixed prayers (Wadud, 1999) -as so far removed from global mainstreams of ulema thinking as to be hardly worth engaging with, or as insufficiently scholarly in the presentation of her arguments, a performative understanding of theology would offer her a place at the table; not as part of a ' discursive tradition' (Asad, 1986) , where she would continue to be judged on the ' authenticity' of her contribution to the conversation, but as a practising 'Muslim' woman who has around her many other 'Muslims', willing and wanting to follow her lead in their practice and understanding of a core sacred text, hence as leader of a performative community which is structured and produced by a 'Quran', and as interpreter of 'Quran' from a particular point of view -which is as valid as any other consensual community's situated interpretation 9 .
I conclude by coming full circle here, reiterating that within Muslim traditions, Quran and hadith as ultimate authority are supported by the methods of qiyas -analogy -and considerations of ijma -the consensus of the community. In the summing up speech for the Kerala traditionalists, their leader moves between rational-legal discourse of proposition and proof, the chanting of a mystical passage, and a reference to ijma. Esack (1997) points out that "Believers as far back and as authoritative as 'Ali ibn ali Talib, Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, advised that, 'The Quran does not speak with a tongue; it needs interpreters and interpreters are people' " (Esack, 1993 (Esack, , 1997 . Arkoun (2003) makes the same point. A performative understanding of religion is perhaps then already anticipated in the Islamic tradition, unlike the Christian tradition which had been restrained for so long by a narrow focus upon either scriptura or traditio (as handed down from church hierarchy) -with the third pole of ' community consensus' hidden from sight and not often acknowledged and only recently -as Dalit, queer and feminist theologies emerge and come of age -becoming recognised as a proper and legitimate part of processes of interpretation. In the 21st century, the gates of ijtihad are open; but, more than this, the appreciation of embeddedness which was long held within and preserved within Muslim traditions is struggling its way into wider recognition.
